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Abstract. Alias resolution techniques (e.g., Midar) associate, mostly
through active measurement, a set of IP addresses as belonging to a com-
mon router. These techniques rely on distinct router features that can
serve as a signature. Their applicability is affected by router support of
the features and the robustness of the signature. This paper presents a
new alias resolution tool called Limited Ltd. that exploits ICMP rate
limiting, a feature that is increasingly supported by modern routers that
has not previously been used for alias resolution. It sends ICMP probes
toward target interfaces in order to trigger rate limiting, extracting fea-
tures from the probe reply loss traces. It uses a machine learning clas-
sifier to designate pairs of interfaces as aliases. We describe the details
of the algorithm used by Limited Ltd. and illustrate its feasibility and
accuracy. Limited Ltd. not only is the first tool that can perform alias
resolution on IPv6 routers that do not generate monotonically increas-
ing fragmentation IDs (e.g., Juniper routers) but it also complements
the state-of-the-art techniques for IPv4 alias resolution. All of our code
and the collected dataset are publicly available.
1 Introduction
Route traces obtained using traceroute and similar tools provide the basis for
generating maps that reveal the inner structure of the Internet’s many au-
tonomously administered networks, but not necessarily at the right level of
granularity for certain important tasks. Designing network protocols [42] and
understanding fundamental properties of the Internet’s topology [18] are best
done with router-level maps. Rather than revealing routers, traceroute only
provides the IP addresses of individual router interfaces. The process of group-
ing IP addresses into sets that each belong to a common router is called alias
resolution, and this paper advances the state of the art in alias resolution.
A common approach to alias resolution is to send probe packets to IP ad-
dresses, eliciting reply packets that display a feature that is distinctive enough
to constitute a signature, allowing replies coming from a common router to be
matched. This paper describes a new type of signature based upon a functional-
ity, ICMP rate limiting, in which an Internet-connected node (router or end-host)
limits the ICMP traffic that it sends or receives within a certain window of time.
This new signature enjoys much broader applicability than existing ones for IPv6
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alias resolution, thanks to ICMP rate limiting being a required function for IPv6
nodes. The signature also complements IPv4 existing signatures.
Our contributions are: (1) The Limited Ltd. algorithm, a new signature-based
alias resolution technique that improves alias resolution coverage by 68.4% on
Internet2 for IPv6 and by 40.9% on Switch for IPv4 (2) a free, open source,
and permissively licensed tool that implements the algorithm.
We evaluate Limited Ltd. by comparing its performance to two state-of-the-
art alias resolution tools: Speedtrap [29] for IPv6, and Midar [26] for IPv4,
using ground truth provided by the Internet2 and Switch networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 provides technical
background and related work for both alias resolution and ICMP rate limit-
ing. Sec. 3 describes the Limited Ltd. technique in detail. Sec. 4 presents the
evaluation. Sec. 5 discusses ethical considerations and Sec. 6 summarizes our
conclusions and points to future work.
2 Background and Related Work
Limited Ltd. is the latest in a long line of alias resolution methods stretching back
over twenty-plus years. An inventory of all previously known techniques (Table 1)
shows that there are only four techniques known to work for IPv6. Of these,
there is a publicly-available tool for only one: Speedtrap [29]. But Speedtrap
has a known limitation of only working on routers that generate monotonically
increasing IPv6 fragmentation IDs, whereas there is an entire class of routers,
such as those from Juniper, that do not generate IDs this way. Relying upon
monotonically increasing IP IDs for IPv4, as does state-of-the-art Midar [26],
presents a different issue: fewer and fewer routers treat IPv4 IP IDs this way due
to a potential vulnerability [15,2]. Limited Ltd. is a publicly available tool that
does not rely upon monotonically increasing IDs, thereby enabling IPv6 alias
resolution on Juniper routers for the first time and IPv4 alias resolution on a
growing class of routers for which Midar will no longer work.
Regarding ICMP, the Internet Control Message Protocol: its IPv4 and IPv6
variants [34,13] allow routers or end-hosts to send error and informational mes-
sages. The RFC for ICMPv6 [13] cites the “bandwidth and forwarding costs” of
originating ICMP messages to motivate the need to limit the rate at which a
node originates ICMP messages. It also recommends the use of a token bucket
mechanism for rate limiting. It explicitly calls for compatibility with traceroute
by stating that “Rate-limiting mechanisms that cannot cope with bursty traffic
(e.g., traceroute) are not recommended”. Furthermore, it states that, in the case
of “ICMP messages [being] used to attempt denial-of-service attacks by sending
back to back erroneous IP packets”, an implementation that correctly deploys the
recommended token bucket mechanism “would be protected by the ICMP error
rate limiting mechanism”. The RFC makes ICMP rate limiting mandatory for all
IPv6 nodes. ICMP rate limiting is a supported feature on all modern routers but
its implementation may vary by vendor [14,12,11,9,23,20,24,22] based on ICMP
message type and IP version. ICMP rate limiting can be performed on incoming
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Year Basis Algorithmsand tools Condition of applicability
IPv4 IPv6
(s) = signature
(t) = topology
(o) = other
(τ) = tool
(δ) = dataset
1998 [32] sourceIP address (s)
Pansiot
and Grad [32]
respond with a common
IP address in yes
Mercator [16] ICMP DestinationUnreachable messages
yes
(τ) (δ)
2002 [40] IP ID (s)
Ally [40] send replies with a shared
IP ID counter
that increases monotonically
with each reply
yes
(τ)
RadarGun [7] yes(τ)
Midar [26] yes(τ) (δ)
2002 [40] Reverse DNS (o) Rocketfuel [40]Aroma [28] IP address resolves to a name yes yes
2006 [17] traceroute (t) Apar [17] respond with ICMP TimeExceeded messages
yes
kapar [25] yes(τ) (δ)
2010 [38]
IP Prespecified
Timestamp
option (s)
Sherry et al. [38]
Pythia [30]
fill in timestamps
as specified
by the option
yes
2010 [36] IPv6 sourcerouting (s) Qian et al. [36,35]
source routing
must be enabled yes
2013 [29] IPv6 fragmentationidentifier (s) Speedtrap [29]
IDs elicited from responses
increase monotonically
yes
(τ) (δ)
2013 [39] IP Record Routeoption (t) DisCarte [39]
fill in IP addresses
as specified by the option yes
2015 [31] IPv6 unusedaddress (s)
Padman-
abhan et al. [31]
126 prefixes on a point
to point link yes
2019 ICMP ratelimiting (s) Limited Ltd.
ICMP rate limiting shared by
interfaces of the router
yes
(τ) (δ)
yes
(τ) (δ)
Table 1: Alias resolution methods
traffic or generated replies. Limited Ltd. makes no distinction between the two.
It works whenever multiple interfaces of a router are subject to a common ICMP
rate limiting mechanism, i.e., when there is a shared token bucket across multi-
ple interfaces. Vendor documentation [23,20,24,11], indicates that ping packets
are more likely to trigger shared ICMP rate limiting behavior. We validated this
observation in a prior survey and in a lab environment. In particular on Ju-
niper (model J4350, JunOS 8.0R2.8), we observed a shared ICMP rate limiting
mechanism for Echo Reply, Destination Unreachable and Time Exceeded packets
across all of its interfaces by default. But on Cisco (model 3825, IOS 12.3), we
observed that the rates for Time Exceeded and Destination Unreachable packets
are limited on individual interfaces by default, and only the rate for Echo Reply
packets is shared across different interfaces [10]. Therefore, we adopted the ping
Echo Request and Echo Reply mechanism in our tool to maximize the chances
of encountering shared ICMP rate limits across router interfaces.
A few prior studies have examined ICMP rate limiting behavior in the Inter-
net. Ravaioli et al. [37] identified two types of behavior when triggering ICMP
rate limiting of Time Exceeded messages by an interface: on/off and non on/off.
Alvarez et al. [4] demonstrated that ICMP Time Exceeded rate limiting is more
widespread in IPv6 than in IPv4. Guo and Heidemann [19] later proposed an
algorithm, Fader, to detect ICMP Echo Request/Reply rate limiting at very
low probing rates, up to 1 packet per second. They found rate limiting at those
rates for very few /24 prefixes. Our work is the first one that exploits the shared
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nature of ICMP rate limiting across different interfaces of a router as a signature
to relate these interfaces for alias resolution.
3 Algorithm
The main intuition behind our approach is that two interfaces of a router that
implements shared ICMP rate limiting, should exhibit a similar loss pattern if
they are both probed by ICMP packets at a cumulative rate that triggers rate
limiting. The key challenges are to efficiently trigger rate limiting and reliably
associate aliases based on the similarity of their loss patterns despite the noise
due to independent losses of probes and replies.
Pseudo code 1 describes how Limited Ltd. divides a set of input IP addresses
into subsets that should each be an alias set. It proceeds iteratively, taking the
following steps in each iteration: First, a random IP address from the input set
is selected as a seed, with all remaining members of the input set being candi-
date aliases for the seed. The seed is probed at incrementally higher rates until
the rate rs that induces ICMP rate limiting is identified (find_rate()). Then,
the seed is probed at that rate of rs while all of the candidates interfaces are
simultaneously probed at low rates. All probing takes place from a single van-
tage point. Loss traces for reply packets from the seed and each of the candidate
interfaces are gathered. It is very challenging to infer that two interfaces are
aliases by directly correlating their loss traces. Instead, the algorithm extracts a
set of features from each loss trace and collectively uses these as the signatures
of the corresponding interfaces(signatures()). Using a classification technique
(classify()), the algorithm examines whether the signatures of candidate and
seed are sufficiently similar to classify them as aliases, in which case the candi-
date is added to an alias set (As). Each identified alias set is refined through
further testing in order to reduce the chance of false positives (refine()). Fi-
nally, the alias set is removed from the input set, and iterations continue until
the input set is empty. The remainder of this section further details these steps.
3.1 Triggering ICMP rate limiting
The goal of find_rate(s) is to efficiently determine rs, the probing rate that
triggers ICMP rate limiting at the router to which seed s belongs. It proceeds
by probing the seed with ICMP Echo Request probes across multiple rounds,
increasing the probing rate with each round until the loss rate of observed ICMP
Echo Replies enters a target range. The target loss range should be sufficiently
large to minimize the effect of random independent losses and also relatively
small to minimize the load on the router. To satisfy these two opposing con-
ditions, we empirically set the range at 5 to 10%. The probing rate remains
constant during each round. The rate is low (64 pps) for the first round, and
exponentially increases in consecutive rounds until the loss rate falls within (or
4
Algorithm 1 Limited Ltd.
Input
S: a set of IP addresses
Output
A: a set of alias sets
K ← controls(S) : set of controls
A← ∅
while S 6= ∅ do
choose at random a seed s ∈ S
Cs ← S \ {s} : candidate aliases for s
rs ← find_rate(s) : rate limiting rate for s
Σs ← signatures(s, rs, Cs,K) : set of signatures
As ← {s} : alias set for s
for c ∈ Cs do: for each candidate c
σs,c ∈ Σs is the pairwise signature for s and c
if classify(σs,c) == true then
s and c are aliases
As ← As ∪ {c} : add c to the alias set
As ← refine(As) : try to reduce false positives
A← A ∪ {As} : add the new alias set to A
S ← S \As : remove the aliases of s from S
return A
exceeds) the target range.3 If the observed loss rate is within the target range,
the probing is concluded and the last rate is reported as rs. But if the loss rate
is higher than the target range, up to eight additional rounds are launched in
a binary search between the last two rates. If the loss rate still does not fall
within the target range, the probing rate that generates the loss rate closest
to the range is chosen. If the target loss range is not reached as the probing
reaches a maximum rate (32,768 pps), the probing process ends without any
conclusion. The duration of each round of probing should be sufficiently long
to reliably capture the loss rate while it should also be limited to control the
overhead of probing. We experimentally set the duration of each round of prob-
ing to 5 seconds, followed by a period, of equal length, of no probing. The right
plot of Fig. 1 presents the CDF of the number of probing rounds to trigger the
target loss rate for thousands of IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces (using our dataset
from Sec. 3.3). We observe that for 90% of IPv4 or IPv6 interfaces, the ICMP
rate limiting is triggered in less than 8 rounds of probing. The left plot of Fig. 1
shows the CDF of the probing rate that triggered the target loss rate (i.e., the
inferred rate for triggering the ICMP rate limiting) across the same IPv4 and
IPv6 interfaces. This figure indicates that for 70% (80%) of IPv6 (IPv4) inter-
faces, ICMP rate limiting is triggered at less than 2k pps. This result confirms
that our selected min and max probing rate covers a proper probing range for
3 We have explicitly verified that the actual probing rate is not limited by the network
card or other factors.
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Figure 1: CDF of the probing rate rs (left) and the number of probing rounds
(right) to trigger ICMP rate limiting for 2,277 IPv4 and 1,099 IPv6 addresses.
more than 99% of interfaces. We note that the binary search process failed to
reach the target loss rate for fewer than 1% of the interfaces. All the parameters
of our probing strategy are empirically determined. Section 5 elaborates on the
ethical considerations associated with the probing scheme.
3.2 Generating interface signatures
A signature based on the loss traces of individual interfaces is obtained by prob-
ing the seed interface at its target rate (rs) while simultaneously probing each
candidate interface at the low rate of Rc pps. Probing a large number of candi-
date interfaces in each round may lead to a better efficiency, but the aggregate
probing rate should remain low so that it does not independently trigger ICMP
rate limiting even if all those candidates are in fact aliases. To address these
two constraints, we set the number of candidate interfaces that are considered
in each round to 50 and Rc to 10 pps. In an unlikely scenario that all of these
50 candidate interfaces are aliases, this strategy leads to a 500 pps probing rate
for the corresponding router that does not trigger ICMP rate limiting in 90% of
routers, as we showed in the left plot of Fig. 1.4
Control Interface. In order to distinguish the observed losses in the loss traces
for the target interfaces (i.e., seed s and individual candidate c) that are not re-
lated to ICMP rate limiting, we also consider another interface along the route to
each target interface and concurrently probe them at a low rate (10 pps). These
interfaces are called the controls, κs and κc. The control κi for target interface
i is identified by conducting a Paris Traceroute [6] towards i and selecting the
last responsive IP address prior to i.5 The loss rate for κi also forms part of i’s
signature. In practice, the controls are identified at the beginning of the Limited
4 The largest reported alias set by Midar and Speedtrap has 43 interfaces. Therefore,
the likelihood of observing 50 candidate interfaces that are all aliases is low.
5 Limited Ltd. maintains the flow ID necessary to reach κs in subsequent probing of
s and κs.
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Seed
s
Candidate
c
Control
κs
Control
κc
Loss rate x x x x
Change point x x
gap→ gap
transition probability x x
burst→ burst
transition probability x x
Pearson correlation
coefficient x
Table 2: Selected features for a Signa-
ture.
01 10 11 11 00 01
1 1 0
2 4 1
High probing rate
loss trace
High probing rate 
derived loss trace
Low probing rate loss 
trace
Figure 2: Mapping between loss traces
with different length.
Ltd. procedure by conducting route traces to all IP addresses in the input set
S. This corresponds to controls() and K is the resulting set of controls.
Inferring Alias Pairs. The above probing strategy produces a separate loss
trace for each interface. We have found that when losses occur simultaneously
at pairs of alias interfaces, they can do so in multiple ways, as the five examples
in Fig. 4 illustrate. The black and white strokes in each trace correspond respec-
tively to received and lost ICMP Echo Replies, and their varied patterns defy
attempts to find simple correlations. We therefore use a machine learning clas-
sifier to identify pairs of aliases. It is based on the following features extracted
from loss traces that, intuitively, we believe capture the temporal pattern of the
losses in each trace. (See also Table 2.)
1. Loss rate: This is simply the number of losses in the trace divided by the
total number of probes in the trace.
2. Change point detection: This is the point in a time series (such as our loss
traces) when the probability distribution of a time series changes [5]. We
adopt a method based on the variation of the mean and the variance [27].
3. Transition probabilities: These are obtained by using each loss trace to train
a Gilbert-Elliot two-state Markov model, in which losses occur in the burst
state and no losses occur in the gap state. The P(gap→ gap) and P(burst→
burst) transition probabilities are sufficient to fully describe the model since
other two probabilities can be easily calculated from these. For example,
P(gap→ burst) = 1 - P(gap→ gap).
4. Correlation coefficient: The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two
loss traces is used as a measure of similarity between them. Calculating this
coefficient requires both time series to have the same number of values but
our loss traces do not meet this condition since we use a higher probing rate
for the seed. To address this issue, we condition the seed’s loss trace to align
it with the loss trace of other interfaces as shown in Fig. 2. In this example,
the length of the loss trace of the seed is four times longer than the ones
from the other interfaces. We consider groups of four consecutive bits in the
seed loss trace and convert it to the sum of the 1’s. The resulting loss trace
has a lower rate and can be directly correlated with other loss traces.
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Figure 3: CDF of the TTL distance
from the Limited Ltd. vantage point of
the IP addresses belonging to an alias
set in our training data.
Figure 4: Raw times series of loss traces
of pairs of aliases.
3.3 Classifying the signatures
We use the random forest classifier from the scikit-learn Python machine
learning library [33]. If it identifies two interfaces as aliases based on their signa-
tures, classify() returns true; otherwise, false. There are several challenges
to building such a classifier: (1) it must learn from training data that represents
the diversity of possible loss traces generated by pairs of aliases; (2) it should
be able to distinguish between losses triggered by ICMP rate limiting and unre-
lated losses; (3) it should have a high precision, so that Limited Ltd. minimizes
false positives; and (4) if the training data come from other alias resolution tech-
niques, such asMidar and Speedtrap, it must be able to generalize to pairs that
they cannot find. We tackled these challenges as follows.
Training and testing data. We have access to ground truth router-level topol-
ogy for two networks, Internet2 and Switch, but these do not suffice to capture
the richness of router behaviors in the Internet as a whole. We therefore ran-
domly selected routable IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes from the RIPE registry [3], and
conducted multipath Paris Traceroute [41] from PlanetLab Europe [1] nodes
towards the first address in each prefix. This procedure yielded 25,172 IPv4
addresses in 1,671 autonomous systems (ASes) and 18,346 IPv6 addresses in
1,759 ASes from 6,246 and 4,185 route traces, respectively. We use Midar and
Speedtrap to identify IPv4 and IPv6 alias sets, respectively, since both tools are
known to have low false positive rates. Pairs of interfaces from these sets are
used as labeled as true. For the false labels, we take the conservative approach
of selecting pairs of IP addresses that are more than 6 hops from each other in
a given route trace. The 6 hop value is empirically set, as 99.9% of the alias
pairs identified by Midar and Speedtrap are fewer than 6 hops apart. This la-
beling process identified 70,992 unique IPv4 and 7,000 unique IPv6 addresses.
15,747 of IPv4 and 1,616 IPv6 addresses are labeled as aliases forming 2,277
IPv4 and 1,099 IPv6 alias sets, respectively. Fig. 3 shows the CDF of hop count
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IPv4 IPv6
Precision Recall F1 score Precision Recall F1 score
Random
forest 0.990 0.499 0.652 0.992 0.647 0.782
Multilayer
perceptron 0.993 0.431 0.591 0.978 0.641 0.769
KNN 0.952 0.638 0.764 0.970 0.622 0.756
SVM 0.986 0.478 0.642 0.988 0.599 0.743
Table 3: Classifier performance on our test set
averaged over ten training/testings.
Gini index
Feature IPv4 IPv6
loss rate for the candidate c 0.169 0.192
burst → burst transition
probability for the candidate c 0.113 0.125
burst → burst transition
probability for the seed s 0.101 0.121
Pearson correlation coefficient 0.091 0.109
loss rate for κc,
the control of the candidate c 0.077 0.104
Table 4: The five most impor-
tant features of our random
forest classifiers.
distance between our vantage point and selected IP addresses and indicates that
these targets are 7-17 hops away from the vantage point. For each alias set, one
address is chosen at random to play the role of the seed s, and the candidate
set is composed of all of the other aliases in the set that are rounded up with
some randomly selected non-aliases to make a Cs of size between 2 (minimum
one alias and one non-alias) and 50 (our cap for the number of addresses to be
simultaneously probed at a low rate). The high rate rs at which to probe the
seed is found through find_rate(s), and the signatures are generated through
signatures(s, rs, Cs,K).
Note that while our classifier is trained on alias sets identified by alias reso-
lution techniques with known limitations, it is nonetheless able to identify new
alias sets. We argue that this is because the training set is sufficiently rich due
to its size and random selection of interfaces, providing considerable diversity
and heterogeneity of loss traces across aliases. Our evaluation in Sec. 4 confirms
this observation and confirms the ability of our technique to generalize patterns
in the training dataset, i.e., the fourth aforementioned challenge.
Choice of classifier. We compared the performance of four classifiers that
scikit-learn library offers, namely random forest, multilayer perceptron, k-
nearest neighbors (KNN), and support vector machines (SVM). To this end, we
evenly divided our dataset into a training and a test set, and compared these
classifiers based on their precision, recall, and F1 score for both IPv4 and IPv6
datasets. Since true labels are only provided from aliases identified by Midar
and Speedtrap, the recall values correspond to the portion of pairs of aliases in
our training set that are detectable by both Midar and Limited Ltd. (IPv4) or
by both Speedtrap and Limited Ltd. (IPv6). Table 3 presents the averaged result
of this comparison after performing 10 randomized splits of the training and test
sets. All classifiers exhibit relatively good performance. We have decided to use
the random forest classifier, which is composed of 500 trees, as it has the highest
precision for both IPv4 and IPv6, and the best F1 score for the IPv6 dataset.
Finally, Table 4 shows the five most important features of our random forest
classifiers based on the Gini index [8] that describes the weight of individual
features in the classifier’s decision. This table reveals a few important points.
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First, no single feature dominates the classifier’s decision, particularly for IPv6.
This confirms the complexity of the patterns for relating loss traces of aliases,
as they cannot be accurately learned by a small number of features or simple
threshold-based rules. Second, this table also illustrates that most of our engi-
neered features are indeed very important in distinguishing loss traces of aliases.
Third, the use of κc as one of the main features suggests that the classifier
distinguishes losses related to rate limiting from other losses.
3.4 Refining the alias set
Independent network loss could accidentally result in classifying unrelated in-
terfaces as aliases, i.e., generating false positives. To reduce the chance of this,
Limited Ltd. incorporates a refinement step, refine(As), that involves repeat-
ing signature() and classify() on the previously-identified alias set As. If a
candidate c fails to be (re)classified as an alias of the seed s, it is removed from
the alias set. This step is repeated until the alias set remains unchanged over
two iterations. Sec. 4 evaluates the resulting reduction of false positives.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate Limited Ltd. with regards to its ability (i) to identify alias pairs
that state-of-the-art techniques, namely Midar and Speedtrap, are unable to
identify, and (ii) to maintain a low rate of false positives.
Dataset. We evaluate Limited Ltd. on ground truth data from the Internet2
and Switch networks. For Internet2, router configuration files were obtained on
10 April, with measurements conducted on 11 and 12 April 2019. There were
44 files, each corresponding to a single router. All are Juniper routers. The files
concern 985 IPv4 and 803 IPv6 addresses/interfaces, from which we removed 436
IPv4 addresses and 435 IPv6 addresses that did not respond to any probes sent
by either Midar, Speedtrap, or Limited Ltd.. The resulting dataset consists of
6,577 IPv4 and 2,556 IPv6 alias pairs. For Switch, a single file was obtained
on 3 May, with measurements conducted 3-5 May 2019. The file identified 173
Cisco routers running either IOS or IOS-XR. From the 1,073 IPv4 and 706
IPv6 addresses listed in the file, we removed 121 IPv4 and 29 IPv6 unresponsive
addresses. The resulting dataset consists of 4,912 IPv4 and 2,641 IPv6 alias pairs.
Reducing false positives. We computed the distribution of number of rounds
for refine() to finalize the alias set for each seed in our dataset: For 79% (98%)
of all seeds, refine() takes 2 (3) more rounds. Note that the minimum of two
rounds is required by design (Sec. 3.4) This basically implies that refine() only
changed the alias set for 20% of the seeds in a single round.
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IPv4 IPv6
Midar ltd ltd
Midar
∪
ltd ltd
Speedtrap ltd ltd
Speedtrap
∪
ltd ltd
Internet2 Precision 1.000 1.000 1.000 N/A 1.000 1.000Recall 0.673 0.800 0.868 N/A 0.684 0.684
Switch
Precision 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Recall 0.090 0.499 0.599 0.384 0.385 0.772
Table 5: Evaluation on ground truth networks.
Results. Table 5 presents the precision and recall of Midar, Speedtrap, Limited
Ltd., and the union of both tools on IPv4 and IPv6 ground truth data from the
Internet2 and Switch networks. Note that it is possible for recall from the union
of both tools to be greater than the sum of recall values for individual tools, as
we observe in the Switch results. This arises from the transitive closure of alias
sets identified from the two tools that leads to the detection of additional alias
pairs. The main findings of Table 5 can be summarized as follows:
1. Limited Ltd. exhibits a high precision in identifying both IPv4 and IPv6
alias pairs from both networks with zero false positives.
2. Limited Ltd. can effectively discover IPv6 aliases that state-of-the-art Speed-
trap is unable to find. In the Internet2 network that uses Juniper routers,
Limited Ltd. was able to identify 68.4% of the IPv6 alias pairs while Speed-
trap was unable to identify any. In the Switch network that deploys Cisco
routers, Limited Ltd. and Speedtrap show comparable performance by iden-
tifying 38.5% and 38.4% of the IPv6 alias pairs, respectively. The results
were complementary, with the two tools together identifying 77.2% of the
IPv6 alias pairs, a small boost beyond simple addition of the two results
coming from the transitive closure of the alias sets found by each tool.
3. Limited Ltd. can discover IPv4 aliases that state-of-the-artMidar is unable
to find. In the Internet2 network, Limited Ltd. identifies 80.0% whileMidar
detects 67.3% of aliases. In the Switch networks, Limited Ltd. identified
49.9% while Midar detects only 9.0% of all aliases.
A couple of detailed observations follow. We conducted follow up analysis on
the behavior of Speedtrap andMidar to ensure proper assessment of these tools.
First, we examined Speedtrap’s logs to diagnose Speedtrap’s inability to detect
any IPv6 aliases for Internet2. We noticed that every fragmentation identifier
time series that Speedtrap seeks to use as a signature, was either labeled as
random or unresponsive. This was not surprising, as prior work on Speedtrap [29]
also reported that this technique does not apply to the Juniper routers that
primarily comprise Internet2. Second, we explored Midar’s logs to investigate
the cause of its low recall for Switch. We learned that only one third of the
IPv4 addresses in this network have monotonically increasing IP IDs.
Limitations and future work. Because ICMP rate limiting could be trig-
gered at thousands of packets per second, Limited Ltd. requires the sending
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of many more packets than other state-of-the-art alias resolution techniques.
The maximum observed probing rate during the experiments for this paper was
34,000 pps from a single vantage point during a 5-second round. On Internet2
(Switch),Midar and Speedtrap sent 164.5k (106k) and 4k (12.7k) probe pack-
ets while Limited Ltd. sent about 4,8M (12.7M) packets. In future work, we plan
to explore ways to reduce the overhead of probing and make Limited Ltd. more
scalable.
5 Ethical Considerations
Limited Ltd. works by triggering limits in routers that are there for protective
reasons. This raises ethical concerns, which we discuss below. To evaluate the im-
pact of Limited Ltd., we have taken two steps: experiments in a lab environment
(Sec. 5.1 and Appendix A), and feedback from operators (Sec. 5.2).
5.1 Lab experiments
We have run experiments in a lab environment on conservatively chosen hard-
ware (over 10 years old) to show that Limited Ltd. has a controlled impact. Our
findings are that: (1) routers being probed with Echo Requests by the tool re-
main reachable to others via ping with a high probability; and (2) Router CPUs
show a manageable overhead at the highest probing rate, leading us to believe
that our measurements are unlikely to impact the control and data planes. (3)
Both Limited Ltd. and existing measurement techniques impact troubleshoot-
ing efforts (e.g., ping, traceroute). Limited Ltd. does not stand out in terms
of impact compared with other accepted techniques. Appendix A details the
experiments which support these conclusions.
5.2 Real-world operator feedback
In addition to lab experiments, we conducted joint experiments with SURFnet
and Switch to evaluate the potential impact of Limited Ltd.. The experiment
consisted in running Limited Ltd. on their routers while they were monitoring
the CPU usage. Each run lasted about 1 minute. For SURFnet, we ran Limited
Ltd. on two Juniper routers: an MX240 and an MX204. The operator observed a
4% and 2% CPU overhead. The operator also told us that the CPU overhead was
observed on the MPC (line modules) CPU and not the central routing engine
CPU. For Switch, we ran Limited Ltd. on three Cisco routers: an NCS 55A1, an
ASR 9001, and an ASR-920-24SZ-M. On the two first routers, the operator told
us that there was no observable change in CPU utilization. On the third router,
which has a lower CPU capacity than the two others, the operator observed a
CPU overhead up to 29%. These results confirm our belief that Limited Ltd. is
unlikely to impact the control and data planes.
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6 Conclusion
This paper presents Limited Ltd., a new, high-precision alias resolution technique
for both IPv4 and IPv6 networks that leverages the ICMP rate limiting feature
of individual routers. We have shown that ICMP rate limiting can generate loss
traces that can be used to reliably identify aliases from other interfaces. Limited
Ltd. enables IPv6 alias resolution on networks composed of Juniper routers that
the state-of-the-art Speedtrap technique is not able to identify. As a part of our
future work, we plan to enhance the efficiency of Limited Ltd. and explore the
use of ICMP rate limiting for fingerprinting individual routers. Both the source
code for Limited Ltd. and our dataset are publicly available6.
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A Ethical considerations
A.1 Precautions taken.
We take two precautions, that we understand to be community best practice: We
sent all probing traffic from IP addresses that were clearly associated viaWhoIs
with their host locations, either at our institution or others hosting PlanetLab
Europe nodes. We have also set up a web server on the probing machines with a
contact email, so that any network operators could opt out from our experiment.
We received no notice whatsoever from network operators expressing concern
about our measurements. Though this is a positive sign, it could be that there
are impacts that were not noticed, or that the concerns did not reach us. We
therefore pushed our examination further, as detailed in the following sections.
A.2 Impact on other measurements.
Limited Ltd.’s find_rate() aims to find an ICMP Echo Request probing rate
that produces an Echo Reply trace with a loss rate in the [0.05, 0.10] range.
6 https://gitlab.planet-lab.eu/cartography
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Figure 5: Maximum loss rates
While it is searching for this rate, it can induce a loss rate above 0.10. If it does
so, it proceeds to a binary search to find a lower probing rate for which traces
falls within the desired range. Fig. 5 shows that loss rates can go as high as 0.60.
The impact on reachability for the IP addresses of that node is that there is a
worst case 0.60 probability that a single ping packet to such an address will not
receive a response if it arrives at the node during the five seconds of highest rate
probing time. Most pings occur in series of packets, so the worst case probabilities
are 0.36 for two ping packets being lost, 0.22 for three, 0.13 for four, 0.08 for five,
and 0.05 for six. These are worst case probabilities for the five seconds at highest
loss rate. Average reachability failure probabilities are 0.22 for one ping packet,
0.05 for two, 0.01 for three, and so on, while a node is being probed at its highest
rate. To judge whether such a level of interference with other measurements is
exceptional, we compare it to the impact of the state-of-the-art Midar tool.
Midar has a phase during which it elicits three series of 30 responses each,
using different methods for each series: TCP SYN packets, to elicit TCP RST or
TCP SYN-ACK responses; UDP packets to a high port number, to elicit ICMP
Destination Unreachable responses; and ICMP Echo Request packets, to elicit
ICMP Echo Reply responses [26]. The probing rate is very low compared to
Limited Ltd.: a mere 100 packets per second across multiple addresses. This is
not a concern for the TCP and ICMP probing. However, the UDP probing taps
into an ICMP rate limiting mechanism that tends to be much less robust than
the typical ICMP Echo Reply mechanism on some routers. ICMP Destination
Unreachable messages are often rate limited at 2 packets per second, which is
1/500th the typical rate at which ICMP Echo Reply messages are rate limited.
(For example, the default rate at which Cisco routers limit ICMP Destination
Unreachable messages is 1 every 500 ms.)
We found that, when an IP address is a traceroute destination, Midar can
completely block ICMP Destination Unreachable messages coming from that
destination. Fig. 6 illustrates the impact. The figure shows two traceroute
results, the top one from before or after Midar being run, and the bottom
one during Midar probing. During the Midar run, we see that traceroute
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(a) Before and after Midar run (b) While Midar is running
Figure 6: Example erroneous traceroute result
receives no responses while it is probing hop 15, where the destination is in
fact to be found. The normal functioning of traceroute is to continue probing
at higher and higher hop counts. Only a few seconds later, when traceroute is
sending probes to hop 20, does it start to receive ICMP Destination Unreachable
messages from the destination. The result is an erroneous traceroute, indicating
that the destination is five hops further away than it actually is. We observed
this erroneous traceroute effect on 2,196 IP addresses out of a dataset of 10,000
IPv4 addresses collected from across the Internet. For both Limited Ltd. and
Midar, transient interference with other measurements can be observed for the
few seconds during which an IP address is being probed. Our conclusion is not
that the diminution in ping reachability induced by Limited Ltd. is necessarily
anodyne. Care should be taken to circumscribe this effect. But we observe that
it does not stand out in terms of its impact on other measurements.
CPU usage. We now examine the CPU overhead generated by Limited Ltd.,
and its potential impact on the forwarding plane and other features involving
the CPU. We have run an experiment in a local network with our own Cisco
(model 3825, IOS 12.3) and Juniper (model J4350, JunOS 8.0R2.8) routers. The
experiment consists in measuring three metrics while find_rate() routine of
Limited Ltd., which has the highest probing rate, is running. We measured: (1)
The CPU usage of the router, (2) the throughput of a TCP connection between
the two end hosts, and (3) the rate of BGP updates. ICMP rate limiting is
configured on both our Juniper and Cisco routers with an access list [21,10],
limiting the ICMP input bandwidth destined to the router to 1,000 packets per
second, which is the default configuration on Juniper routers.
TCP throughput was unaffected, at an average of 537 Mbps and BGP updates
remained constant at 10 per second. CPU usage was at 5% for Cisco and 15% for
Juniper when Limited Ltd. was not probing. During the probing, the maximum
overhead was triggered for both at a maximum probing rate of 2,048 packets per
second, with a peak at 10% for Cisco and 40% for Juniper during 5 seconds. Our
conclusion is that there is an impact of high probing rates on CPU, but we do
15
not witness a disruptive impact on either the data plane (TCP throughput) or
the control plane (BGP update rate).
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